Fukushima Year 2; Part 1
Our review of the second year’s events surrounding the 3-11 disaster is broken into three parts. The first part covers the specific technical issues at the plant. The subsequent parts will cover the political and social changes in the last year and the third part will look at humanitarian and health issues.
The second year at Fukushima Daiichi has been a year of investigations. The first year of trying to bring some control to the disaster has enabled limited inspection into the reactors with scopes and robots in the second year. Radiation levels remain high in many areas of the plant and parts of the reactor buildings are still too dangerous for human entry.
This has also been a year of exponential growth for storage at the plant. The location luckily includes a wide area of flat land that has been used to install huge fields of water holding tanks, radioactive debris storage lots and a new water treatment system.
TEPCO made considerable progress understanding the conditions at unit 1. Workers were able to float a balloon up the equipment shaft to the refueling floor to take images. Most of the damage was as expected, this did help confirm there was nothing considerably out of the ordinary on the 5th floor. The radiation level above the reactor well area was a mere 60 mSv/h, much lower than the same locations at units 2 and 3. A second inspection of the isolation condenser system revealed extensive damage to the HVAC systems on the 4th floor. No obvious damage to the isolation condenser system was admitted by TEPCO.
Multiple tactics were used to try to “see” onto the refueling floor. The one that finally made it was an upside down advertising balloon of a light bulb with a camera attached. Efforts were also made to gather data about the containment of unit 1. Multiple scope inspections were done that revealed considerable damage inside containment including charred debris, black residue that appeared to be melted metals or fuel or burned paint. Broken concrete was found in the bottom of the containment drywell, it is assumed to have been part of the reactor vessel concrete shield. The water inside containment stays at the top of the torus downcomers. This indicates that there is some amount of leakage out of the lower sections of containment that prevent the structure from filling with water.
Radiation levels in containment showed a moderate level near the height of the reactor vessel bottom. These levels dropped the lower the probe went into the containment drywell. These readings indicate there is likely not a large volume of melted fuel in the pedestal below the reactor vessel. The image to the right shows the total volume of melted fuel had it all stayed in the pedestal. The more likely scenario is that the melted fuel has at least in part migrated out of the pedestal and is no longer in the drywell area of the containment structure. (5)
Two inspections were conducted on the torus room of unit 1. The first sent a probe down into the torus room by way of a floor penetration near the west wall. This found a considerably high level of radiation underwater, near the floor of the torus room. The general area showed evidence of high heat and possibly scorch marks, melted electrical wiring was also found nearby The second probe location found less damage and lower radiation levels near the torus room floor. It did find that closest to the torus tube the radiation levels increased indicating there could be a radioactive source inside the torus tube.
This could be either a gathering of radioactive fuel debris or dissolved cesium in the torus water in a high concentration. TEPCO has not sent a robot in to unit 1’s torus for further inspections due to the high radiation levels. The radiation levels will complicate further efforts to investigate or conduct work in the torus area of unit 1. (3)(2)
Hydrogen has also been an ongoing problem in unit 1. TEPCO initially claimed this was left over hydrogen from the initial accident and took steps to purge this through pushing nitrogen into the containment structure. TEPCO does not say how the hydrogen purge process on the torus is specifically done. After reaching zero percent levels of hydrogen in containment and the torus TEPCO has once again needed to begin the process to purge hydrogen from the torus, indicating this is an ongoing problem. (4)
TEPCO also attempted to open the TIPS room door on the first floor using the Quince and Packbot robots. Since the radiation levels are around 4 Sv/h in this area workers could not enter. The robots made their way in but were unable to turn the key to open the tips room door. (6)
Another unpublished 2011 incident at unit 1 was discovered in 2012 after TEPCO was compelled to release their emergency coordination center videos. Around March 23rd, Plant manager at Masao Yoshida told the corporate office that pressure in unit 1 containment had increased again to dangerous levels. Yoshida asked for the proper approval procedure to conduct another venting operation at unit 1. Asahi Shimbun reports that the pressure began to drop by March 24th, the additional venting may not have been conducted. (1)
Unit 1 radiation readings:
Considerable investigative work has been done at unit 2 this year but with limited findings. The lack of found damage or other oddites has at least provided the ability to rule certain things out.
The TIPS room was inspected via robot in March of 2012. This room contains probes that run into the reactor vessel. The tips room was in very good condition with the exception of a horizontal crack in the wall that backs the containment vessel. The crack continued on part of the TIPS room hallway wall. This location didn’t have a significantly increased radiation level compared to other portions of the room. Workers were able to briefly work in the TIPS room later in the year with the aid of extensive shielding and protective gear. (12)
After a number of instances where temperatures went erratic and sometimes extremely high in the unit 2 reactor vessel, TEPCO decided to install a new thermometer. The new thermometer was to be installed through a TIPS probe line. Workers prepared the equipment but later found they are unable to insert anything into the reactor vessel via the TIPS lines. All four tubes are blocked with some form of debris that was found when they inserted a fiber optic camera into the lines in late February 2013 (7)(8)
More work has been conducted on the refueling floor of unit 2. A second robot was sent in to obtain readings and photos. It found very high levels directly above the reactor well with readings as high as 880 mSv/h over the center of the well. Levels below the concrete cap are estimated to be about 880 million mSv/h.
From this work we spotted what appeared to be a steam leak out the side of the reactor well indicating a possible containment cap gasket failure. This leak appears to be under pressure, indicating it may be related to corium (melted fuel) heat. Unit 2 was releasing 8 million bq/hr of radiation in July of 2012 via the refueling floor open wall panel. (15)
Workers were able to enter the mezzanine basement level of unit 2 in March of 2012. The basement stairwell was flooded with rusty looking water that read about 155 mSv/h at the surface. The door to the torus room read 35 mSv/h and inside the torus room was about 150 mSv/h. The reddish orange paint on the torus tube was intact unlike at unit 1. Some rusty streaks had appeared on the walls near air handling vents and one vent was dented in towards the ductwork in the mezzanine basement area. This work preceded sending robots into the torus room for further inspections. (13)
In December TEPCO sent Toshiba’s new unnamed walker-bot into the torus room of unit 2. This new robot walks on four legs and includes a tethered mini robot to inspect more difficult areas. It was able to do an inspection of the torus downcomer area with the mini robot.(9)
No major damage or leaks were found near the downcomer. The general condition of this portion of the torus was very good with little or no damage. Sadly, the walker-bot failed and fell over part way through completing it’s mission. A worker had to rush in and retrieve it.
TEPCO also inserted a scope into unit 2’s containment structure for a second time. This new attempt in late March 2012 was able to obtain useful radiation readings and water levels. The water level was 60cm deep at the drywell floor, leaving it at the lower lip of the downcomer tube that leads to the torus. Unit 2’s containment leaks somewhere at that level.
The radiation readings found inside unit 2’s containment were of interest. 72 sV/h was found at the location indicated on the diagram, near the platform in the lower area of containment. Taking distance and shielding into account the estimated radiation inside the pedestal directly below the reactor vessel would be in the 5 gigaSv/h to 10 teraSv/h range.
By comparison, the control room at Chenobyl was hit with 300 sV/h, this amount was lethal in 1-2 minutes. (10)(11)
In March of 2012 workers entered the mezzanine basement of unit 3. The basement stairwell had the same standing rusty water and around 150 mSv/h of radiation as unit 2. The steel door to the torus room had bowed out, making it impossible for workers to open. They were able to gain access to the torus room in July 2012 to send in a robot. It made it most of the way around the torus before losing contact. The robot remains stranded in the torus. (13)(58)
The Packbot was sent into unit 3 to re-examine the area near the containment equipment hatch on the first floor. This found higher levels near the door than were found previously in April 2012. This containment door is fitted with a heavy concrete plug that was found in April to be pushed out of the normal position. Radiation levels as high as 4780 mSv/h were found in the floor track for this door in November 2012. At some point previously, workers installed a gas control duct to unit 3’s containment. The November 2012 work sent robots in to inspect this duct. The gas duct was found to be sound and not leaking leaving the containment door leaks as the possible cause of the increasing levels. (16)(17)(20)
Robots were sent into unit 3 in May 2012 to inspect the first floor TIPS room. They found the steel door and door frame had been ripped out of the concrete walls and blown down the TIPS room hallway. The TIPS room is on the opposite side of the building (below the spent fuel pool area) from where the bowed out torus room door and the pushed out concrete containment plug are located. (18)
Workers began removing debris from unit 3’s spent fuel pool in September 2012. Reports from workers at the plant stated that they are deciding as they go how to approach the removal. This work is made even more difficult as it is done remotely with large cranes and a video camera. Workers must be in full radiation gear even in the operation booth.
We have spotted workers on the platform around unit 3 via the TEPCO web cam on days they do removal work. They appear to be briefly assisting the preparation for removal work. Complicating the removal process, much of the debris fell inward on the deck and into the pool. The refueling crane for unit 3 is also in the pool at a steep angle and resting on some of the fuel racks. As workers began the project they dropped a large steel beam into the pool. (19)(14)
In February 2013, as workers continued to remove debris with cranes from the spent fuel pool, the mast of the refueling crane fell into the pool. A large mangled beam was removed from the pool, as it moved the mast broke loose and fell to the bottom of the pool. It landed near a rack of control rods with the other end tangled in rebar and other debris. TEPCO claims the mast has not caused damage to the fuel in the pool but only provided radiation readings as evidence. (14)
Unit 4 received considerable attention through the second year.as worries about the condition of unit 4’s building continued. The slowly collapsing 5th floor didn’t help matters. TEPCO released a series of soundness reports and tests through the last year. These disclose that a considerable portion of the west side of the reactor building has failed. TEPCO did do ongoing survey work to check the west wall for movement or growing cracks. This did not show any considerable movement.
TEPCO also announced that the spent fuel pool could withstand considerable earthquake shaking based on their estimations. This was widely promoted to try to ease public concern about the spent fuel pool. What was not mentioned was that the pool had a fairly high vertical shaking margin, it has a much smaller horizontal shaking margin. (21)
Debris was removed from the 5th floor of unit 4 and eventually all of the equipment. Unit 4 was in a refueling outage when the quake struck leaving all of the components for the reactor such as the caps and the concrete cover stacked on the refueling floor. As the debris was cleared they removed the reactor cap, the containment cap and the concrete slabs that covered the reactor well along with other components. This image to the right provides a good visual for the parts still in place at the other units. (22)
Soon after last year’s anniversary of the disaster TEPCO put an underwater camera into the unit 4 reactor well. It showed as expected, no fuel in the core. There was a small amount of concrete and steel building debris along with a good coating of the brown algae seen in the spent fuel pools of units 3 and 4. (24)
In August 2012 two unused fuel assemblies were removed from unit 4’s spent fuel pool. They were found to have some corrosion along with a few pieces of concrete debris. Considerable damage or breakage were not found. (23)
Unit 4’s top floor has been stripped off and prepared for the installation of the fuel removal building. This will be a steel framed building that bridges between the reactor well for support and the ground below. A steel shell will help control the environmental and radiation issues as they work to begin removing the fuel from unit 4’s spent fuel pool. The beginnings of the steel building at unit 4 can be seen in the photo below on the right.
Plant Wide Efforts
TEPCO has made some plant wide progress yet many complex challenges remain unsolved. As part of the long term work they established a cask storage yard in the areas of higher elevation at the plant. This series of concrete boxes will eventually hold spent fuel casks. Defueling the spent fuel pools has been a priority even though this normally simple task has now become hard to solve. The common pool has undergone some rearranging in preparation to begin accepting spent fuel from the reactor building pools. (34)
The Sarry water decontamination system removes cesium from the contaminated water as it is removed from the reactor buildings and other locations around the plant. There is also a desalination rig in place to remove salts left over from the sea water injection effort to cool the reactors. The somewhat cleaned water is stored in blue clean water tanks until it is pumped back into the reactor to try to cool the melted fuel. One of the larger projects this year has been the ALPS water decontamination system that will replace Sarry. It needs to pass inspection by the new nuclear regulator before it can begin full operation with test runs to begin soon. A problem with the containers used to hold the system’s filters has caused extensive delays. The canisters provided by a US nuclear contractor cracked and shattered if dropped from even a short distance. If ALPS can begin operation it still does not solve the tritium problem as the system can not remove this isotope. TEPCO intended to dump water treated by ALPS into the sea. They attempted to claim that tritium has no public health risk but that is not the case. (27)(28)(29)(30)
230,000 tons of contaminated water is being stored on site, most in large metal tanks, some in a series of lined pits. The total of contaminated water on site is estimated to have “hundreds of trillions of becquerels of tritium” contained in all of this water they intend to dump into the Pacific ocean. Various experts have urged that this water should not be discharged until the tritium is removed. (27)(43)
NRA so far has barred TEPCO from dumping the tritium containing water into the sea. TEPCO claims they will try to win consent from locals including the fishing groups to allow them to dump the tritium laced water into the sea. Even back in October TEPCO wanted to dump water into the sea as storage was quickly running out. (32)(33)(43)
Many new technical tools were put into use at Daiichi in the last year. A new more portable gamma camera was put in use. A cyber suit was presented to the media with the intention of it being used at Daiichi, though TEPCO has not announced this actually happening yet. The Frigo-ma robot was introduced into work but failed when they tried to use it in unit 3. Toshiba’s new four legged robot was tried in unit 2’s torus, it locked up and fell over having to be rescued by workers. (26)(43)(16)(9)
At the end of the first year of the disaster TEPCO drastically cut their technical reporting from the plant. Included in these cuts were some critical reactor data sets. This reduction of public accountability and reporting makes monitoring the plant much more difficult. Besides the constant reporting of water leaks at the plant we occasionally saw bits of the unexpected, workers found rats taking up residence at the plant. While this sounds trivial, even minor things like this can cause equipment failures. Animals that make their way into the plant also pose a contamination risk if they leave. There have also been bouts of heavy handed censorship by TEPCO. In one attempt they poorly Photoshopped a photo to hide something on unit 4 only to end up mocked by the internet denizens and ended up on a Photoshop failure website. (25)(35)(47)
TEPCO and various expert groups have an idea where the melted fuel might be at unit 1. They are more challenged to confirm this at the other units. One process suggested by Los Alamos National Lab in the US is to use a muon particle detector that would act similar to an x-ray to detect the melted fuel. A program to do the work as been proposed, no word yet if TEPCO has accepted the deal. (31)
Some of the problems at the plant may just be too much for TEPCO to handle. In February 2013 the IAEA announced a multilateral effort to try to decommission the reactors at Fukushima Daiichi. Problems such as locating the melted fuel and how to safely remove it have challenged TEPCO and their contractors. TEPCO has given some vague ideas towards long term decommissioning. Actually doing them will take technologies not even invented yet. (36)
Workers at Daiichi are now working with a maximum allowed total exposure of 50 mSv, down from the 250 mSv at the height of the disaster. Through the last year most worker exposures were in the low numbers up to 100 mSv.. For October to December 2012 43 people were in the 20 mSv bracket as new exposures. These new lower levels can not be looked at without considering the very high exposures some took during the worst of the disaster. A few workers were in the 500 mSv and higher range due to their heroic efforts to try to regain control of the plant and prevent worse damage. While these levels were not high enough to put workers into direct life threatening health problems, even those with lower exposures in the 20-50 mSv range increase their risks for future health problems including cancer. (40)
Over all exposures are down partially due to less work being done at the plant but risks remain. The tasks that need to be done now such as physically going into the reactor buildings to do tasks the robots can not will expose workers to high doses of radiation. Efforts such as taking short shifts and using titanium shielding help to keep exposures down but can not solve all situations. Most of the new exposures are being taken by contract workers as TEPCO relies on them to complete tasks at the plant, sparing TEPCO’s more experienced workers. At the same time the plant suffers from a worker shortage. It is unclear how they will be able to continue the long term work and keep a trained workforce in place. (38)(39)
The untrained workforce that is not familiar with the workings of the plant frequently do not receive sufficient pre-work coordination. In one case that could have gone tragically wrong a worker used a hand saw to cut into conduit that contained live high voltage power cables. (38)
It was discovered recently that workers who had been in the basement of the unit 3 turbine building in March 2011 were exposed to highly radioactive water. Of these workers, those that stayed in the basement for longer than the others required medical attention for exposure related injuries. A total of four workers were exposed with some receiving a 180 mSv exposure. Two contract workers recorded a 400 mSv level in the water surface and fled the area. The workers with the injuries were standing in the water. Some of those injured eventually went to the media this year with their story. They are now suing TEPCO for their injuries and for not informing them of the known danger before sending them in. TEPCO has admitted the incident happened. (41)(42)
Members of the Fukushima 50 have been talking to the media on a very limited basis. TEPCO doesn’t want them making statements the company would find inconvenient and has restricted their on record discussions with the media. Workers also fear retaliation. While internationally many see the workers are heros, local residents blame them for the disaster and see no difference between the workers and TEPCO’s corporate decision makers. Workers have been harassed or lost apartments due to this kind of blame and anger. Some of the workers are now suffering from PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder). The traumatic events at the plant, facing death and losing their own homes and family members has been difficult for them as it is for the other evacuees. (45)(56)
Workers have given more insight into the early events at the plants. Two were in unit 1’s control room when it exploded and found themselves covered in internal ceiling materials knocked down by the blast. They spoke of working 48 hour shifts in the control rooms while subsisting on biscuits and water. They nearly ran out of even that at one point. Plant manager Yoshida had to take up a cash collection from workers to try to send someone out for basic supplies. (45)
On March 11 workers wrote their names on a white board in the seismic isolation building, one said he felt like he was writing his tombstone. Plant manager Masao Yoshida instructed the workers still at the plant to do so. In a way he hoped to record their names in case they all died at the plant. As the explosions ripped through unit 1 and later unit 3 Yoshida told how they were unaware of exactly what had happened at the time and thought they would all die each time. They did not know if they were hydrogen explosions or some much more dangerous critical failure. Yoshida has also been adamant that they never intended to abandon the plant. He also made sure any non-critical staff were evacuated. Among his concerns if the plant was abandoned was that units 5 and 6 would also melt down. Both were being manually cooled as their intake systems were damaged by the tsunami. Asahi Shimbun recently broke a story how an elite group of SDF soliders had readied a plan to do a last ditch rescue of the workers if the plant had spiraled out of control to try to save the remaining workers lives. (59)(48)
Yoshida gave this interview in August 2012 after he was diagnosed with esophageal cancer. He is currently in the hospital, his condition has apparently deteriorated but a prognosis was not given. Prosecutors wished to interview him recently but decided his health was too fragile to deal with an interrogation interview and opted to subpoena earlier interviews. (48)(49)
Workers have been more open this year to criticize and expose wrongdoing at Fukushima Daiichi. One worker recorded his work there and documented many things being done to misinform and abuse the contract workers. Some were given a false understanding of their exposure consequences. Insufficient work preparation information was given. His work was to be handing out radiation protection equipment. What he was made to do once he got there was to change out the cesium filters on one of the water treatment devices. A dangerous job with high radiation exposure potential. He also mentions the layers of sub contractors that siphon off of workers pay leaving them with much less than is intended to be given to workers at the plant. (46)
It was also discovered this year that a 17 year old was working at Fukushima Daiichi a month after the disaster began. He was cutting holes in turbine building walls and was employed by Kajima Corp in violation of Japanese law. (55)
The scandals continued this year as some workers admitted covering their dosimeters with lead plates to fake downward their exposures. A subcontractor was implicated by a worker who refused to participate in the ruse. The subcontractor dogged workers to participate, telling those who refused they were not cut out for the work. (51)(52)
Workers also went to the media in January 2013 to point out that head, feet and hands were not being monitored for radiation by TEPCO. These are important readings in a high radiation environment and for tracking the potential for future health problems. TEPCO dismissed the failure as only being beta emitter readings, workers pointed out the previous instances where workers received beta burns after being in contaminated water. (52)
The situation for workers and exposure tracking has not improved much. While workers at Fukushima Daiichi were issued cards and books to specifically track them over their lifetimes if they received a high enough dose during their work, many are falling through the cracks. TEPCO failed to submit 21,000 worker exposure records to the central database. Asahi Shimbun also pointed out how the sub contractor system can easily fail to submit exposures or even a correct number for a worker. These problems remain unsolved in 2013 leaving many still unable to truly prove their doses if they develop medical problems later on. 63 workers were found in March 2013 to have had lower doses sent in than their actual readings.(54)(60)
Even now the work at the plant can be dangerous. Working in respirators and at times heavy gear is difficult. The hot summer months have proven to be the worst, requiring extra breaks for workers to rest. Two workers in July passed out while working on the debris removal efforts at unit 3. The workers apparently recovered but were sent to the hospital. Various falls, broken bones and heart attacks have been happening over the last year. (50)
Our Additional Analysis On Year Two
Our research team did a number of in depth papers and efforts in the last year. We looked at the spent fuel pools and their ongoing characteristics, the stability of the pools and the fuel contained in them is critical to safety and preventing more radiation releases. We also revisited the explosion at unit 4.
The explosion at unit 4 had been described by TEPCO as being caused by hydrogen gas backflow through the standby gas treatment system. Our analysis showed that route would not be capable of providing enough hydrogen to cause an explosion. TEPCO’s theory also failed to explain the long time frame between unit 3’s explosion cutting off gas flow and unit 4 reaching the concentrations needed to cause unit 4 to explode. The spent fuel pool is more likely to be the source of the hydrogen or the major contributor to the ongoing hydrogen build up in the building. Our full paper on this issue can be found here. (57)
We found that the high levels of gamma rays produced during the disaster will contribute to degradation of the spent fuel pools themselves. Corrosion also plays a major role in the safety and stability of the fuel in the pools. Salt added to the reactor systems and spent fuel pools along with other substances and factors add to a condition that accelerates corrosion in pipes and fuel assemblies. Our papers on these issues can be found here. (57)
The conditions at unit 4’s pool have had time to change over the last two years. Our analysis found that the decay heat in the newest fuel assemblies has lowered to the point that a fuel assembly could be removed from the pool without the potential for it to catch fire. We also found that the pool itself could now drain and not cause a massive pool fire. These two scenarios still contain the very high risks of incredibly high and deadly radiation levels. This heat to fire issue being removed is a small improvement among the many risks that still remain. Our papers on these findings can be found here. (57)
The biggest challenge for the next year at the plant will be investigating the reactor vessels and locating the melted fuel. It will be important towards understanding the individual meltdowns and also for establishing a more realistic long term plan. The location of the fuel in units 2 and 3 has perplexed both TEPCO and researchers. We hope the third year brings more concrete answers on this issue.
1. TEPCO New Video; Unit 1 Needed Venting Again Weeks After Disaster January 25th, 2013
TEPCO New Video; Unit 1 Needed Venting Again Weeks After Disaster
2. Unit 1 Torus Inspection Review February 25th, 2013
3. Unit 1 Torus Radiation Shows Possible Source Location February 28th, 2013
4. TEPCO Restarts Nitrogen Injection In Unit 1 Suppression Chamber January 8th, 2013
TEPCO Restarts Nitrogen Injection In Unit 1 Suppression Chamber
5. What The Melted Fuel At Fukushima Unit 1 Looked Like In The Pedestal January 11th, 2013
What The Melted Fuel At Fukushima Unit 1 Looked Like In The Pedestal
6. TEPCO To Send Robots Into Unit 1 TIPS Room July 3rd, 2012
7. Update On Situation At Fukushima Daiichi September 20th, 2012
March 1, 2013
9. TEPCO Inspects Unit 2 Torus With Walking Robot December 11, 2012
10.Unit 2 Scope Results; What We Found March 27, 2012
11. Our Unit 2 Rough Estimation Of Radiation Levels In Containment March 28th, 2012
Our Unit 2 Rough Estimation Of Radiation Levels In Containment
12. Unit 2 New Robot Inspection Findings March 23rd, 2012
13. Workers Enter Units 2 & 3 Basements; Enhanced Images & Analysis March 14th, 2012
Workers Enter Units 2 & 3 Basements; Enhanced Images & Analysis
14. Unit 3 Location Of Crane & Mast In Pool February 20th, 2012
15. Unit 2 At Fukushima Spewing 8 Million Bq Per Hour Almost 1.5 Years Later July 24th, 2012
Unit 2 At Fukushima Spewing 8 Million Bq Per Hour Almost 1.5 Years Later
16. Robot Inspection Of Unit 3 Finds Increasing Radiation Levels, New Robot Fails.November 28, 2012
Robot Inspection Of Unit 3 Finds Increasing Radiation Levels, New Robot Fails.
17. Unit 3 Containment Shield Plug Leaking, Possibly Moved April 20th, 2012
18. Unit 3 Robot Entry Video & New Enhanced Images May 24th, 2012
19. Unit 3 Debris Accident & Pool Damage September 27, 2012
20. TEPCO Inspects Gas Control & Introduces A New Robot November 28th, 2012
21. TEPCO Soundness Report On Unit 4 Admits Larger Failures September 5, 2012
22. Unit 3 SFP Inspection, Reactor Cap Removed At Unit 4 September 13, 2012
23. Unit 4 Removed Fuel Inspection Results August 28th, 2012
24. Unit 4 Reactor Well Video: Enhanced Images March 17, 2012
25. UPDATE: TEPCO Backdates Public Reports, Scales Back Public Accountability March 21st, 2012
UPDATE: TEPCO Backdates Public Reports, Scales Back Public Accountability
26. New Gamma Camera To Be Used At Fukushima April 2nd, 2012
27. Fukushima No. 1 water cleaner to be tested Japan Times – February 28th, 2013
28. TRITIUM:HEALTH CONSEQUENCES NIRS Fact Sheet
29. Tritium Detected at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station – February 28, 2013
30. TEPCO’s New Decontamination System Delayed By Tank Failures December 26th, 2012
31. More On Muon Core Imagining At Fukushima October 21st, 2012
32.Nuclear regulator conditionally approves new water purifier tests at Fukushima plant
Mainichi – Feb 22nd 2013
33. Trial OK’d for new device to remove radioactivity
Daily Yomiuri – February 22, 2013
34.The Future Of Fukushima Daiichi Spent Fuel December 25th 2012
35. Atomic Rats, Fishing For Beams & Cleaning Up The Common Pool At Daiichi December 20th, 2012
Atomic Rats, Fishing For Beams & Cleaning Up The Common Pool At Daiichi
36. IAEA to propose multilateral efforts to retire Fukushima nuclear reactors
Kyodo News – February 22, 2012
37. CurrentWorkerExposures_130131e0101 (1) TEPCO Report January 31, 2013
38. Staffing Issues & Future Plans Dog TEPCO & Fukushima Daiichi November 30. 2012
Staffing Issues & Future Plans Dog TEPCO & Fukushima Daiichi
39. Decyphering TEPCO Worker Exposures December 5th, 2012
40.Trimming Exposure Data, Putting Radiation Workers at Risk: Improving Disclosure and Consent Through a National Radiation Dose-Registry
Am J Public Health. 2007 October; 97(10): 1782–1786.
41. 4th Worker Highly Exposed In #3 Turbine Basement November 5, 2012
42. Fukushima Workers Sue TEPCO For March 2011 Injuries November 1, 2012
43. More Water Storage Issues At Fukushima Daiichi October 25, 2012
44. Japanese Researchers Invent Cyber Robotic Armor For Fukushima Workers October 18, 2012
Japanese Researchers Invent Cyber Robotic Armor For Fukushima Workers
45. Noda Talks With Some Of The Fukushima 50 October 9, 2012
46. Worker At Fukushima Daiichi Exposes Labor Conditions September 19, 2012
47. TEPCO’s Photo Failure Gets “Better” September 5, 2012
48. Masao Yoshida Interview, Compiled Information & Statements August 13th, 2012
49. Former Fukushima nuclear plant chief’s testimony siezed by criminal prosecutors
Japan Daily Press – February 4, 2012
Former Fukushima nuclear plant chief’s testimony siezed by criminal prosecutors
50. Two Workers At Daiichi Hospitalized July 31, 2012
51. Subcontractor In Scandal A TEPCO Subsidiary, Glass Badges Checked July 23, 2012
Subcontractor In Scandal A TEPCO Subsidiary, Glass Badges Checked
52. More Details On The Fukushima Workers Exposure Scandal July 21, 2012
53. TEPCO Workers Unmonitored Exposures Likely Occurred January 12, 2013
54. TEPCO fails to submit dose data on 21,000 Fukushima plant workers
Asahi Shimbun – February 28, 2013
55. 17 Year Old Boy Working At Daiichi Month After Disaster May 12, 2012
56. Fukushima 50 Battle Depression, PTSD And Discrimination January 2, 2013
57. fukuleaks.org/web Research Papers
58. Fukushima Daiichi Unit 3 Torus Inspection July 2012
59. PROMETHEUS TRAP/ ‘Shadow units’ (1): Secret rescue mission at the Fukushima plant
Asahi Shimbun – March 4, 2013
60. 63 workers exposed to higher radiation than logged in their records
Asahi Shimbun – March 2, 2013
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